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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I show that the casualties associated with warfare can be largely 
avoided.  This includes combatant casualties, as well as noncombatant and friendly 
forces.  The U.S. military is frequently tasked with deploying into foreign countries and 
performing duties that range from conventional combat operations to humanitarian relief 
and training host nationals.  The politics of every deployment are complicated and 
invariably there will be some resistance, both domestically and internationally.  People 
may feel victimized or marginalized and may demonstrate with protests, both peaceful 
and violent.  How, then, may the use of non-lethal force be best applied in hostile 
situations in lieu of the “shout or shoot” approach commonly associated with military 
operations?  Scientific advances in non-lethal technology may serve to curb violence 
while still allowing Soldiers and Marines to accomplish their missions.   
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There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, 
nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.  For 
the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only 
lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order.1 
With the emergence of irregular warfare as the dominant operating environment 
in the foreseeable future (2006 Quadrennial Defense Review), the ability of U.S. forces to 
judiciously use force is central to the challenge of operating in unconventional 
environments.2  The incorrect application of force may have catastrophic strategic 
implications.  However, scientific advances in non-lethal technology may serve to reduce 
the level of violence our service members receive, as well as dispense, while performing 
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, peace keeping operations (PKO), and stability 
operations, support operations (SOSO).  Each of these missions is characterized by 
asymmetric threats, complex or congested terrain, and belligerents intermingled with 
innocents.  Non-lethal weapons (NLW) may limit noncombatant fatalities, lessen 
collateral property damage, and demonstrate the ability to dispense a controlled and 
appropriate amount of force.3  If the United States integrates NLWs into its doctrine and 
operations, it is likely that our allies and other nations will follow.  If the United States 
                                                 
1 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Paul Sonnino (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 
International, Inc., 1996), 49. 
2 The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review will be discussed in greater detail along with other strategic 
level policies in Chapter II. 
3 Department of Defense, Directive 3000.3, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Defense, July 9, 1996), 2.  This policy defines NLWs as “weapons that are explicitly 
designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, 
permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment.”  The DoD term 
non-lethal weapon and its definition apply to all service members of the U.S. military and should not be 
confused with other terms such as nonlethal defense, less-lethal weapons, less than lethal weapons, 
noninjurious disabling measures, sub-lethal, low-end, pre-lethal, tunable lethality, limited-effects 
technology, soft kill, new age weapons, disabling technologies, nonlethal disabling technologies, and low 
collateral–damage weapons.   
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casts doubt on the efficacy of NLWs in hostile operating environments, it is likely to 
impede the development and deployment of these weapons.   
Service members, Department of Defense (DoD) employees, and U.S. contractors 
currently deployed overseas are expected to comply with established rules of engagement 
(ROE) and rules for the use of force (RUF).  Unfortunately, forces being deployed to Iraq 
and Afghanistan are still designed for Major Combat Operations (MCO) and not COIN.  
Given the decentralized nature of irregular warfare (IW), combatants may face incidents 
that have geo-political ramifications.  With technological advancements in 
telecommunications, satellite imagery, and the demand for 24 hour news, a higher 
standard of conduct is expected as states deploy their forces.  Respond too lightly and risk 
unacceptable levels of military and civilian casualties and a loss of legitimacy.  Respond 
with too much force and risk losing the moral high ground, public support, and in some 
environments, support of the population.   
Several issues must be addressed before employing NLWs into IW operations.  
One must quickly and easily be able to determine whether rules or laws exist that prohibit 
their use (general legality), whether the weapon(s) may cause excessive injury or 
suffering (legality of the weapon), and whether the weapon can be controlled in such a 
way that may distinguish between combatants and noncombatants (legality of use).  
Having first determined the legalities associated with the use of NLWs, commanders may 
then consider how best to approach fielding the weapons and the controls under which 
they must be employed.  First, there is a cost associated with NLWs, and commanders 
must choose this option over other available and possibly cheaper kinetic tools and 
weapons.  Second, clear and concise rules of engagement must be established.  Third, 
benefits must be weighed and risk must be assessed by all levels of command.  And 
fourth, troops must be trained on a full spectrum of weaponry and be able to recognize 
and apply appropriate levels of force in potentially volatile or unstable situations.   
Conceptually, the use of NLWs in IW is appealing.  NLWs, if effective, would 
allow the judicial application of force, limiting tactical and strategic risk.  Yet for all the 
perceived appeal of NLWs, doctrine and guidance for their deployment is scant at best.  
This absence of doctrine exposes the potential user of NLWs to questions about the  
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appropriate usage of NLWs.  Ambiguity for tactical units should be avoided.  Junior 
NCOs and officers are thus left with kinetic tools, even though NLWs may be more 
efficient and effective in IW operations.   
Given the complexities of IW and the likelihood that asymmetric conflict, not 
conventional warfare, will dominate operations in the near-term, developing and 
deploying NLWs may provide increased capability at lower risk to deployed forces.  
NLWs may drastically decrease the gap in the force continuum (Appendix A) for 
missions such as facility security, crowd control and crisis management.  NLWs, if 
deployed properly, can limit civilian causalities as well as limit the adverse consequences 
of kinetic operations and bring security to conflict prone environments.  This seems 
particularly relevant given General Petraeus’ comments in September 2007.  He states, 
“In Baghdad -- and throughout Iraq -- we have tried to complement kinetic, military 
operations with equally aggressive non-kinetic reconstruction operations.”4  NLWs can 
not be merely seen as a less-than-lethal weapon system, but need to be viewed within the 
context of IW and the need for alternative forms of response that conserve scarce 
resources, lower operational risk, and still provide our forces with a robust means of 
response to hostile intent.  
B. THESIS 
In this thesis, I examine whether NLWs can enhance the capability of the U.S. 
armed forces to conduct IW operations.  This study analyzes the costs, benefits and risks 
associated with NLWs in an IW environment.  If NLWs can provide a more robust set of 
kinetic alternatives without increasing cost or risk, then NLWs should be integrated into 
existing doctrine and deployed for use in current operations.  On the other hand, if NLWs 
raise cost or risk, whether NLWs should be deployed into IW environments becomes 
more ambiguous.  The purpose of this course of research is to provide a set of concepts 
and tools that, when fully developed and implemented, can enhance the capability of  
                                                 
4 The Boston Globe, “Q&A with General David Petraeus,” National News. 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/09/07/qa_with_general_david_petraeus/?pag
e=4 (accessed 13 September 2007). 
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American forces to provide security and stabilize conflict and post-conflict environments.  
Unlike previous analyses of the use of NLWs in IW environments, this study explicitly 
connects the use of NLWs and the principles and imperatives of COIN doctrine found in 
Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency.  The principles and imperatives are 
varied, and certainly NLWs may not be deemed appropriate for every situation.   
The principle of understanding the environment may be supported by 
demonstrating an ability to deescalate a situation based on disciplined and mature 
decision-making and an understanding that one’s actions may lead to more serious 
ramifications or irreversible damage.5  Security under rule of law occurs when the 
populace supports and legitimizes its government, and a government that confronts 
violence with less than lethal force retains a position of morality and restraint.6  Using the 
appropriate level of force not only shows restraint, humility, and an ethical and moral 
understanding of law and basic human rights, but also strengthens the government’s 
authority and legitimacy.7  The principles, imperatives and paradoxes of COIN may all 
be referenced in FM 3-24.  After an understanding of the nature of IW and then of the 
current and developing NLW stock, one can begin to see just how far warfare has 
evolved since the columns and rows of our forefather’s muskets filled the air with gun 
smoke.  With so many other options to lethality including diplomatic, political, economic, 
social, infrastructural, and information operations, NLWs provide one more alternative 
between shouting and shooting.  This research attempts to show how NLWs may be 
applied to a multitude of situations within an IW environment and still not violate or 
denigrate any of the principles or imperatives. 
                                                 
5 United States Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, D.C.: Department of the 
Army, 15 December 2006), 1-22. 
6 Ibid., 1-23. 
7 Ibid., 1-25. 
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C. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The Lieber Code of 1863 is considered by many to be the cornerstone of 
humanitarian law.8  Initially produced for the Union army during the U.S. Civil War, it 
established that “military necessity does not embrace means and methods of warfare that 
are cruel, and that it must take into account the long-term consequences of the use of a 
particular weapon.”9  The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 was the first international 
treaty concerning weapon design, essentially banning the use of bullets that exploded 
upon contact with the human body.10  Similarly, the Hague Declaration of 1899 went on 
to outlaw the use of dum-dum bullets, or bullets which “expand or flatten easily upon the 
body,” and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, bans the use of chemical and biological 
weapons.11  
On 8 April 1975, President Ford issued Executive Order 11850, which renounced 
first use of Riot Control Agents (RCA) by the United States, except as a defensive 
military measure.12  RCA is defined as chemicals that “can produce rapidly in human’s 
sensory irritation or disabling effects which disappear within a short time following 
termination of exposure.”13  Only five years removed from the Kent State shootings, this 
was in an effort to protect civilians under U.S. military control such as demonstrators and 
rioters.14  In short, the order states that “the United States renounces… first use of riot 
                                                 
8 Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, 
Resolutions and Other Documents (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 3–23.  
9 Margaret Coppernoll, “The Non-Lethal Weapons Debate,” Military Press (Spring 1999), 2.  
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1999/spring/art5-SP9.htm (accessed 11 August 2007). 
10 Robin Coupland, “Clinical and Legal Significance of Fragmentation of Bullets in Relation to Size 
of Wounds: Retrospective Analysis,” British Medical Journal (14 August 1999), 1.  
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0999/is_7207_319/ai_55670104 (accessed 2 August 2007). 
11 Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, “The 1925 Geneva Protocol/ Protocol for the 
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods 
of Warfare,” Genomics Gateway.  http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/gateway/ARMS/GENEVA.HTM 
(accessed 15 July 2007). 
12 Joseph Benkert, “U.S. Policy and Practice with Respect to the Use of Riot Control Agents by the 
U.S. Armed Forces,” (paper presented to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on 
Readiness and Management Support, Washington, D.C., 27 September 2006).  
13 Ibid., 2. 
14 Scott Bills, Kent State/May 4: Echoes Through a Decade (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 
1988). 
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control agents in war” with four exceptions.  These exceptions include (1) the military 
may use RCAs “in areas under direct and distinct U.S. military control”; (2) when 
“civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or 
avoided”; (3) during certain rescue missions; and (4), the military may use RCA “in rear 
echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat.”15 The Resolution of Ratification 
adopted by the Senate specifically requires that the President shall not alter the RCA 
usage provisions promulgated in the executive order.16   
The U.S. signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993.  It bans the 
possession and use of chemical weapons but allows the use of toxic chemicals and their 
precursors in law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes, provided that the 
types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.17  The CWC also allows states to 
possess RCA, however, bans the use of RCA as “a method of warfare.”18  This is exactly 
where proponents for the use of NLWs in IW encounter reluctance by bureaucrats and 
politicians who fail to pursue clarification of terminology for the use of RCA in domestic 
law enforcement and for IW.  Some proponents argue that law enforcement is one aspect 
of COIN, as well as of stabilization operations.  Opponents might argue that using NLWs 
for operations outside domestic law enforcement would undercut the nature of the CWC.  
In 1995, Lt. Gen. Anthony Zinni anticipated the need to fill the void between 
verbal warnings and lethal force for unarmed hostiles while extracting United Nations 
(UN) peacekeepers from Somalia.19  His plan involved the withdrawal of over 6000 
coalition troops.  He used intelligence operations to ensure the local population was 
informed that his forces were armed and ready with non-lethal grenade launchers and 
                                                 
15 Benkert, “U.S. Policy and Practice with Respect to the Use of Riot Control Agents by the U.S. 
Armed Forces,” 4. 
16 Joseph Benkert, “U.S. Policy and Practice with Respect to the Use of Riot Control Agents by the 
U.S. Armed Forces,” (paper presented to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on 
Readiness and Management Support, Washington, D.C., 27 September 2006), 2. 
17 Arms Control Association, “Rumsfeld Wants to Use Riot Control Agents in Combat,” Arms 
Control Today.  http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_03/nonlethal_mar03.asp (accessed 1 June 2007). 
18 Ibid., 1.  
19 Erik L. Nutley, “Non-Lethal Weapons:  Setting Our Phasers to Stun?  Potential Strategic Blessings 
and Curses of Non-Lethal Weapons on the Battlefield,” Occasional Paper 34, (August 2003).  
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat34.pdf (accessed 29 July 2007). 
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shotguns that fired pepper sprays, stinger grenades, flash bangs, and sticky foam, as well 
as caltrops to supplement various barriers at night.20  In the end, not a single shot was 
fired and all troops and equipment were withdrawn without suffering a Task Force 
casualty.21  Lt. Gen. Zinni became an outspoken supporter for the military employment 
of NLWs stating, “Our experience in Somalia with non-lethal weapons offered ample 
testimony to the tremendous flexibility they offer to warriors on the field of battle.”22   
In 1996, DoD issued Directive 3000.3, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons.  DoD 
policy specifically states that with NLWs there still remains a risk of injury or fatality.23  
NLWs are only non-lethal by design, or intent, in an effort to minimize fatalities and 
permanent injuries. DoD Directive 3000.3 also highlights that NLWs may be used in 
conjunction with lethal force, do not preclude the first use of lethal force when 
appropriate, and do not limit one’s authority to use all available weapons in the event of 
self-defense.24  It is here that the U.S. NLW policy seems to contradict the more 
restrictive CWC and Executive Order 11850.  Because of this duality in policy, their may 
be some wriggle room for senior administration officials and military officers to address 
the need for NLWs in IW, particularly since both the nature of threats and availability of 
NLWs have changed so dramatically since 1975 and even 1993.  This was followed by 
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 96, which identified the significance of 
advanced NLW technologies and reinforced the importance of providing the U.S. 
military with tools which would facilitate operations in future conflicts.25    
                                                 
20  F. M. Lorenz, “Less Lethal Force in Operation United Shield,” Marine Corps Gazette 79, no. 9 
(1995), 70. 
21  F. M. Lorenz, “Non-Lethal Force: The Slippery Slope to War?” Parameters 26, no. 3 (1996), 58. 
22  Government Executive, “Force without Fatalities,” Defense.  
http://www.govexec.com/features/0501/0501s4.htm (accessed 15 July 2007). 
23 Department of Defense, Directive 3000.3, 1-4. 
24  Department of Defense, Directive 3000.3, 2.  
25 104th Congress, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996,” Report 104-112, 
(1995).  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1995_rpt/s104112.htm (accessed 23 June 
2007). 
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D. CURRENT REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES 
The Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons establishes two large categories of 
NLWs, which further subdivides into six functional areas.26  These categories include 
counter-personnel technologies and counter-materiel technologies.  A third, smaller, 
category involves counter-capability assets which are designed to disable or neutralize 
buildings or other mechanical/ electrical objectives.  Counter-personnel technologies 
include agents for crowd and riot control, personnel debilitation, facility clearing and area 
denial for personnel.  Counter-materiel technologies include agents for area denial to 
vehicles and vessels and facility obstructions.  A brief description of each is provided 
below:  
Counter-personnel technologies permit the use of military force while also 
reducing the risk of casualties among friendly forces, noncombatants, and enemy forces:  
• Crowd control capabilities may deter a potentially hostile crowd or an out of 
control mob. 
• Incapacitation of personnel means having the ability to capture a particular 
target, without harming personnel standing nearby. 
• Area denial systems might include obstacles which cause distress to personnel 
who enter a restricted area. These systems may also serve as an effective and 
humane alternative to landmines. 
• Clearing facilities of personnel reduces the risks of noncombatants casualties 
and collateral damage associated with military operations in urban terrain 
(MOUT). 
   
Counter-materiel technology aims to reduce or eliminate the effectiveness of a 
combatant’s weapons and or equipment.  Counter-materiel options are more productive 
and less destructive than conventional weapons and reduce political ramifications as well 
as combatant/ noncombatant fatalities. These options include: 
• Area denial to vehicles has application in sea and air, but is predominately 
used in denying vehicles to land areas. Current technologies include wheeled 
                                                 
26 Commandant of the Marine Corps, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, “Joint Concept for Non-
Lethal Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists.  http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/land/docs/NONLETH.HTM (accessed 15 March 2007). 
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and tracked vehicles and may include systems which reduce maneuverability 
through an area, such as physical barriers.  
• Disabling vehicles, vessels, and facilities involve systems that alter the ability 
for an engine, transmission, wheel or track to function properly.  Certain 
technological developments involve agents which target rubber and insulation.   
 
One may see these types of weapons in any number of operations including 
communication and information control techniques, psychological operations, and 
disturbing command-and-control operations.27   
E. STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows.  In the following chapter, I 
review the literature of NLWs in IW.  Separately, there is a multitude of resources for 
each, but combined, the literature is sparse.  This literature review considers each 
separately and considers each in the context of this thesis.  COIN principles and 
imperatives will then be reviewed, followed by information regarding the use of lethal 
force in IW and the use of NLWs in IW.  Chapter III, “Case Studies,” considers relevant 
and contemporary historical lessons learned with regard to the use of force in military 
operations, both conventional and unconventional.  Three cases, all based on ground 
troop operations in Iraq in 2003, will also be reviewed.  Chapter IV, “NLWs and Stability 
Operations,” begins by considering NLWs in stability ops, and then reviews potential 
risks, benefits and costs to conclude the chapter.  Chapter V, “Conclusions and 
Recommendations,” summarizes the material covered in this thesis and presents some 
final thoughts by the author for bridging the gap between show of force and lethal force.   
                                                 
27 Richard L. Garwin and W. Montague Winfield, Non-Lethal Technologies: Progress and Prospects 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 12. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be called research, 
would it?28 
The employment of NLWs in wartime remains a matter of debate.  As early as 
500 BC, the Chinese tactician Sun Tzu argued that the epitome of skill was to subdue the 
enemy without fighting, implying that non-lethal tactics were of superior utility to 
kinetically oriented lethal applications of force.29  Yet, to some, the attempt to remove 
force from warfare is associated with kindness, whereby kindness is the most costly of 
mistakes.  Clausewitz argued that the search for such ingenious methods to disarm or 
defeat an enemy was, in essence, a fallacy.30  The debate continues to this day.  Do 
NLWs facilitate mission accomplishment or do NLWs expose service members to greater 
risk?   
In this chapter, I examine the literature on the development and employment of 
NLWs in IW operations.  I examine whether existing doctrine and policies for NLWs 
complement IW and COIN doctrine.  If there is a gap between NLW and IW doctrine, 
then such a gap must be closed else service members may face conflicting instructions on 
the employment of NLWs.  On the other hand, if the literature adequately addresses the 
use of NLWs in IW, the question becomes, why do we observe such an infrequent use of 
NLWs in current operations? 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows.  Following the literature 
review, we delve deeper into Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24), to  
 
 
                                                 
28 Quote commonly attributed to Nobel Prize winning physicist Albert Einstein. 
29 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Thomas Cleary (London: Shambhala Publications Inc., 2005), 5.  
30 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 732. 
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discuss COIN principles and imperatives.  The next section examines the question of the 
application of lethal force in IW environments.  The final section concludes and identifies 
gaps in the literature.   
1. Strategic Policies 
The issue of NLWs is contentious and historical and contemporary examples 
support and reject the use of NLWs in warfare.  While there is an abundance of 
information and opinions regarding NLWs and IW tactics, there is a distinct lack of 
literature on the use of NLWs in IW.  The lack of literature is curious given the potential 
for NLWs in IW; potential that appears to be untapped to this day.  In this section, I 
review the strategic policies on the use of NLWs in the promotion of national security 
goals.   
While the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States does not 
explicitly address the development and employment of NLWs, the NSS does explicitly 
state that two of the goals of the U.S. are to maintain order and establish the rule of law.31  
This guidance permeates all subsequent strategy documents and doctrine.  More 
specifically, the U.S. is a signatory to Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions.  
Of the 185 countries that are party to the Geneva Conventions, there are 135 countries 
party to Additional Protocol I (AP I).32  AP I asserts the principle that states do not have 
unlimited latitude in the methods and means of warfare.  AP I stipulates “no weapon 
system should render death inevitable, that weapons should not be indiscriminate in their 
effects, and that their effects should not inflict superfluous injury nor cause the victim 
suffering that is unnecessary for the military purpose of the user.”33   
                                                 
31 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C., White 
House, 2006), 4. 
32 R.M. Coupland, “The Effect of Weapons: Defining Superfluous Injury and Unnecessary Suffering,” 
Medicine and Global Survival, 3:A1, (1996), 1.  
http://www.askywhale.com/oldies/jeuxaides/militaryservice/effetshospitaliers.html (accessed 2 August 
2007). 
33 Ibid., 2. 
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From the NSS, the Secretary of Defense derives his own vision in the National 
Defense Strategy (NDS).  The NDS fails to mention the application of NLWs in national 
defense, but does recognize the importance of flexibility as the military will continue to 
perform operations ranging “from training and humanitarian efforts to major combat 
operations.”34  The NDS essentially states what missions may be performed, and why, 
but not how they will be conducted.  From the NSS and NDS, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff can establish his National Military Strategy (NMS).   
The 2006 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism provides the 
“comprehensive military plan to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism,” and claims to 
be built upon four years of lessons learned fighting the GWOT, as well as from the 
findings of the 9/11 Commission and various other DoD contributors.35  The NMS 
references irregular or unconventional warfare as being associated with the enemy’s 
tactics or capabilities, but not the U.S. ability to respond as such.  Additionally, there is 
no mention of NLWs in the NMS, however, the document identifies an objective to, 
“interface with national, Military Department, and commercial laboratories to maintain 
awareness of promising state-of-the-art GWOT technology for the warfighter.”36   
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) describes on multiple occasions 
asymmetric threats, irregular warfare, unconventional tactics, techniques and procedures, 
counterinsurgent operations, and technological advancements.37  One passage states, 
“The QDR sought to provide a broader range of military options for the President and 
new capabilities needed by Combatant Commanders to confront asymmetric threats.”38  
The document continues, “the force will include a wider range on non-kinetic and 
conventional strike capabilities” and “non-kinetic capabilities will be able to achieve 
                                                 
34 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Defense, 2005), 6. 
35 Department of Defense, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006), 3. 
36 Ibid., 29. 
37 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 
2006). 
38 Ibid., 1. 
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some effects that currently require kinetic weapons.”39  This may be the first overt 
reference to how NLWs may be incorporated into the overall strategy of the U.S. Armed 
Forces.   
“Full spectrum dominance” is the key term in Joint Vision 2020.40  Unfortunately, 
in almost every subsequent strategic document established since its writing in 2000, there 
is virtually no reference as to how that full spectrum dominance may be achieved using 
anything more than conventional weapons against an unconventional adversary.  Because 
of this omission, many of the U.S. military’s field manuals are subsequently void of 
similar verbiage.  The omission is striking as it suggests that kinetic operators are the sole 
requirement for full spectrum dominance.   
2. Tactical Publications 
This section analyzes existing Army doctrine that drives military operations.  The 
publications, in general, range in dates from the Cold War to the GWOT.  This is 
particularly disconcerting due to the significant changes in threat composition and tactics 
since the mid-1980s.  There is progress including NLWs into doctrine, most notably since 
the DoD established its NLW policy in 1996.  Unfortunately, the policy itself may not be 
enough as senior leaders struggle with limited guidance and budgets and face an 
unconventional enemy.  
At first glance, there does not appear systemic guidance on the use of NLWs.  FM 
19-15, Civil Disturbances, contains scant reference to the employment of RCA.41  DoD 
further limited the use of lasers in 1995 and codified policy with DoD Directive 3000.3, 
Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, in 1996.42  Directive 3000.3 mandates the establishment 
of a joint service organization responsible for the development and employment of  
 
                                                 
39 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 49. 
40 Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 2000), 3.  
41 United States Army, Field Manual 19-15, Civil Disturbances (Washington, D.C.: Department of the 
Army, 25 November 1985). 
42 U.S. Department of Defense News Release, “DOD Announces Policy on Blinding Lasers,” 
DefenseLink.  “http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=608 (accessed 1 August 2007). 
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NLWs; defines “non-lethal weapons”; and designates the Commandant of the U.S. 
Marine Corps as the executive agent (EA) for the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program 
(JNLWP).43  
By December of 1996, the Department of the Army (DA) Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) published Pamphlet 525-73, Concept for NonLethal Capabilities 
in Army Operations, which identifies various restrictions upon the military concerning 
the application of certain non-lethal technologies, but which also clarifies diverse types of 
nonlethal technologies and their potential applications.44  A Memorandum of Agreement 
dated 21 January 1997 (MOA-1997), established how each of the four services (Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and Marines) including the U.S. Special Operations Command would 
each have oversight for the development and application of NLWs applicable to their 
respective mission and objectives.45  Section 230 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1997 included the NLW program and funded it for the consolidation 
and integration of the DoD and individual services NLW technology programs.46  Also in 
1997, in a move to put into effect “Public Law 104-106, Section 219, Non-lethal 
Weapons Study,” DoD established the action office for the JNLWP at Marine Corps 
Base, Quantico, Virginia.47   
In 1998, TRADOC published FM 90-40/ MCRP 3-15.8, Multiservice Procedures 
for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons, which “provides initial guidance for 
the employment of NLW in a tactical environment.”48  In December of the same year, 
DoD established Directive 5100.77, Law of War Program, which ensures that the U.S. 
                                                 
43 Department of Defense, Directive 3000.3, 2. 
44 United States Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-73, Concept For Nonlethal Capabilities in Army 
Operations, Vol. C1, (Fort Monroe, Virginia, Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, 1 
December 1996), 1-5. 
45 Coppernoll, 3.  
46 104th Congress, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997,” Report 104-201 
(1996).  http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctr/docs/hr3230.html; accessed 23 June 2007. 
47 Nick Lewer, “Research Report 2,” Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project (BNLWRP), 
June 1998.  http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/nlw/research_reports/researchreport2.php (accessed 27 July 
2007). 
48  United States Army, Field Manual 90-40, Multiservice Procedures for the Tactical Employment of 
Nonlethal Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, October 1998).  
 16
military shall serve in conformity with the regulations respecting the international laws 
and customs of land warfare.49  This was followed by a MOA dated 23 June 1999 (MOA-
1999), which made only slight changes to its previous MOA (MOA-1997) and still 
mandated a tactical function for any NLW development.  The Joint NLW Master Plan, 
established in June 2000 takes both a top-down and bottom-up approach to development 
and implementation by addressing the need for the integration of NLWs into advanced 
concept technologies as well as for those Soldiers and Marines who require specific 
technologies for specific missions at the tactical level.50 
In March of 2002, DoD Directive 3216.2, Protection of Human Subjects and 
Adherence to Ethical Standards in DoD-Supported Research, establishing protective 
policies for humans associated with DoD research.51  Joint NLW research, development, 
testing and evaluation programs are validated by the EA, but managed by lower-tiered 
DoD departments in accordance with (IAW) DoD Directive 5000.1, Defense 
Acquisition52, and DoD Directive 5000.2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs and Major Automated Information systems.53   
FM 90-40, Multiservice Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal 
Weapons (October 1998), received an update in January 2003.  Re-labeled FM 3-22.40, 
the manual states, “Now more than ever, the minimal level of tolerance for collateral 
damage and loss of human life, coupled with the tendency for the typical adversary to 
exploit the rules of engagement (ROE) to his benefit, necessitates an effective and 
                                                 
49 Department of Defense, Directive 5100.77, DOD Law of War Program (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Defense, 9 December 1998).  
50 United States Joint Forces Command, “Doctrinal Implications of Low Collateral Damage 
Capabilities,” The Joint Warfighter Center Joint Doctrine Series, Pamphlet 2 (27 January 2003).  
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/jwfcpam2.pdf (accessed 16 June 2007). 
51 Department of Defense, Directive 3216.2, Protection of Human Subjects and Adherence to Ethical 
Standards in DoD-Supported Research (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 25 March 2002). 
52 Department of Defense, Directive 5000.1, Policy for the Defense Acquisition System (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Defense, 12 May 2003).  
53 Department of Defense, Directive 5000.2-R, Policy for the Operation of the Defense Acquisition 
System (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 12 May 2003).  
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flexible application of force through non-lethal weapons.”54  Possibly the most concise 
NLW reference for the military, it contains guidance on various NLWs and how they 
may be employed as well as lessons learned from previous NLW experiences. 
In April 2005, FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, received an update and was re-
labeled FM 3-19.15, Civil Disturbance Operations.  It addressed civil unrest for 
OCONUS operations and the military role of providing assistance to civil authorities.55  
These are each significant due to the global threat and each includes relevant tactics, 
techniques, and procedures to today’s threat environment.  Similar to FM 3-22.40, 
Multiservice Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons, this manual 
identifies situations in which NLWs may be employed and provides information on 
available NLW systems, including the Non-Lethal Capability Set (NLCS).56 
Considering the significant absence of tactical guidance for employing NLWs in a 
contemporary operating environment (COE), one case highlights how NLWs can be 
employed in unconventional operations.  A U.S. military police unit successfully 
employed NLWs in response to “a violent rock-throwing and stick-wielding crowd,” 
while providing support for United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in 2000.57  
Because of the success of this operation, Brown argues that NLWs should be a standard 




                                                 
54 United States Army, Field Manual 3-22.40, Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, January 2003), ix. 
55 United States Army, Field Manual 3-19.5, Civil Disturbance Operations (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Army, April 2005).  
56 United States Army, Field Manual 3-22.40, E-1.  See also, Council on Foreign Relations, “Non-
Lethal Weapons,” Defense.  
http://www.cfr.org/publication/7750/defense.html?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2F61%2Fnonlethal_weapons 
(accessed 20 August 2007).  The article states, “each NLCS has supplies for 200 soldiers and contains a 
range of NLW, including expandable batons, 12-gauge “point” rounds made of sponges, riot helmets, riot 
shields, and Caltrops.”  Of note, the NLCS is adaptable and can be modified for varying weapons and costs. 
57 James B. Brown, “Non-Lethal Weapons and Moral Preeminence in Peacekeeping Operations,” 
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, 2000, 1.  
https://www.jnlwp.com/Resources/Articles/LtColJamesBrown.htm (accessed 1 December 2006).  
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research into non-lethal technologies should be encouraged to exploit the ability of our 
armed forces to employ force without unnecessarily taking life when it can possibly be 
avoided.”58   
These operational level documents attempt to provide guidance for tactical level 
troops based on ambiguous references to “non-kinetic capabilities” and “asymmetric 
threats” propagated in higher level strategic documents.  Senior military leaders must 
therefore interpret strategic policies and intent and exercise careful consideration when 
attempting to employ weapons or tactics not reinforced by their superiors.  For example, 
the Law of War Program highlights principles of the laws of armed conflict which 
include the principles of discrimination and proportionality.  Discrimination is based on 
the idea that civilians should not be made to suffer in war and deliberate attacks on 
noncombatants should be avoided.  Proportionality is based on the idea that it is unjust to 
inflict greater harm than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives.  
Without familiarity of these principles, tactical level operators may be violating 
restrictions and limitations outlined in manuals that they are unfamiliar with.  
Furthermore, the few references for NLWs found within military documents pertain to 
such a limited scope of NLWs that they may not apply to an interested party.  As such, 
there appears to be little incentive for Soldiers and Marines to employ weapons outside of 
the conventional arsenal.   
3. Commercial Publications 
In the previous section, I identified the lack of strategic and tactical doctrine on 
the use of NLWs in MCO and IW.  As noted in the 2006 QDR, IW is the most likely 
challenge facing U.S. forces in the near future.  To adequately discuss whether the 
literature suggests that NLWs can complement IW operations, I first briefly review the 
seminal works on IW.  Establishing these concepts in imperative to the subsequent 
discussion of the principles of COIN and how NLWs may enhance COIN capabilities.   
                                                 
58 Brown, 1. 
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Hammes argues in support of fourth generation warfare (4GW) theory.59  This 
theory asserts that warfare evolves based upon the state’s ability to recognize its 
opponent’s critical weaknesses and then exploit those weaknesses over time.60  4GW 
includes guerilla warfare, terrorism, asymmetric warfare, unconventional conflict, and 
counterinsurgency, with no distinction between each.  4GW supporters assert that those 
who are able to push their message out to the most people and get those people to buy 
into the message generally win the war.  Hammes ultimately seeks to demonstrate to the 
reader the significance of 4GW theory as it applies to the current military-politico 
climate, particularly with regard to Islmist jihad.  He uses the current wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, as well as the GWOT as examples of 4GW and tinges his thesis with the 
assertion that the U.S. has never won a 4GW engagement, citing Vietnam, Lebanon and 
Somalia as examples.   
In places like Afghanistan and Iraq, anti-coalition forces (ACF) are using every 
asset at their disposal to ensure that public support for the war wanes.  In 4GW, they 
employ asymmetric strategies to avoid their conventional military disadvantage.  They do 
not attempt to present physical sources that can be targeted by conventional means, but 
employ global networks, the internet, broadband, DVD, and the global media.  Hammes’ 
book highlights the necessity for counterinsurgents to use these same resources against 
insurgents.  Moreover, his book compels discussion on whether lower lethality tools such 
as NLWs may combat the information war propagated by the insurgents.  NLWs, when 
combined with media, can strike fear into a potential adversary and disrupt his ability to 
function, particularly if the adversary understands that they suffer publicly, will not be 
martyred, and will be held accountable for his actions.   
Galula’s work, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, is considered 
by many to be the seminal text on the laws of insurgency, outlining strategy and tactics to 
combat such threats.  Galula states that “the population...becomes the objective for the 
                                                 
59 Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, First Edition ed. (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 
ix. 
60 William S. Lind, et al., “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps 
Gazette, (October 1989). 
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counterinsurgent as it was for his enemy.”61  This is critical for discussions pertaining to 
conventional military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In both wars, though each may 
separately involve various combat operations, they are essentially a struggle for the hearts 
and minds of the people.  Because the legitimate government must win both the political 
and military battles, it is essential that they remain cognizant of the third and fourth order 
effects associated with their tactics for each.  Although Galula’s text was written nearly 
fifty years ago and primarily for COIN and revolutionary war, many of its lessons are 
relevant today and can be seen reflected in contemporary literature.    
Nagl describes the counterinsurgency doctrine practiced by the British during the 
Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1957, and compares it with the actions taken by the 
United States in Vietnam between 1950 and 1975.62  In describing these operations, he 
underscores the need to learn continuously and adapt to improve situations.  Central to 
his text is the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the population.  Winning the 
support of the population, Nagl contends, “is the critical battle in a counterinsurgency 
campaign.”63  While it may seem an engagement may be won by employing kinetic 
weapons, that win may be at the expense of alienating the people, thus strengthening the 
insurgent.  Nagl cites examples of U.S. forces in Vietnam employing overwhelming 
firepower, but the subsequent death and destruction further alienated the COIN from the 
population.  He concludes that while the British military learned to adapt during its 
irregular warfare experience of counterinsurgency in Malaya, the U.S. Army failed to 
adapt during similar experiences in Vietnam.64   
Nagl also contributed to an article titled, “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes 
of CounterInsurgency,” a precursor to the Army’s Field Manual 3-24, 
Counterinsurgency.65  The authors argue in favor of certain conditions that must be met 
                                                 
61 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Pall Mall Press, 1964), 52. 
62 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam (Praeger Publishers, 2002).   
63 Ibid., 28-29. 
64 Ibid., 215-217. 
65 S. E. Cohen, et al., “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” Military Review 
(Mar-Apr 2006): 49–53. 
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in order to defeat an insurgency.  These conditions, framed in principles and imperatives 
of COIN will be reviewed in the next section, along with several paradoxes of COIN.  
What is central to this section is the theme of the article itself.  The authors state 
“conducting COIN operations is counterintuitive to the traditional American approach to 
war and combat operations.”66  Furthermore, the authors argue, “dollars and ballots will 
have a more important effect than bombs and bullets.”67  This underscores Nagl’s 
assertion that the U.S. military will have to learn to think beyond kinetic capabilities in 
order to achieve success in IW.   
NLWs are unconventional weapons that may provide the U.S. military a useful 
tool during unconventional operations.  If one considers the goal of COIN operations is to 
win hearts and minds, these technologies provide capabilities aimed at reducing collateral 
damage and minimizing casualties in operations occurring in close proximity to 
noncombatants.  Rather than killing a confrontational civilian, NLWs enable live capture.  
Rather than bomb a structure, NLWs can deny access, clear buildings, or neutralize 
critical infrastructure and equipment.  Unfortunately, while there appears no shortage of 
authors contributing to the literature of either counterinsurgency or NLWs, those which 
describe how NLWs may serve IW are far less abundant.  Therefore, the result is an 
absence of discussion as to how NLWs may benefit not just the population, but the forces 
that use them.   
B. COIN PRINCIPLES AND IMPERATIVES 
Joint Publication 1-02 defines counterinsurgency as, “those military, paramilitary, 
political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat 
insurgency.  Also called COIN.”68  This section will take a closer look at the Army’s FM 
3-24, Counterinsurgency, to present for the reader the military perspective of COIN 
operations and how it should conducted.  Eight principles and five imperatives are 
described and serve as references for those forces serving in COIN operations.  When 
                                                 
66 Cohen, 52. 
67 Cohen, 52.  
68 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 12 April 2001), 127. 
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reading them, it is important to keep in mind, that COIN is “a struggle for the 
population’s support.”69  A government can only force its citizens to do so much before 
they revolt.  Therefore, there has to be some effort for a government to consider the needs 
of the people as it seeks legitimacy.   
FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, was introduced in December 2006.  It highlights 
some of the key insurgencies of the 20th century and serves as sort of a “how-to” guide on 
what works and why.  It describes the various principles and imperatives of COIN in 
detail.  The principles include legitimacy as the main objective; unity of effort; political 
primacy; understanding the environment; intelligence as the driver for operations; 
isolating insurgents from their cause and support; security under the rule of law; and 
long-term commitment.  While the majority of military manuals such as 
Counterinsurgency may address military involvement in a full spectrum of operations, 
each falls short of providing even a clear explication of understanding for the role of 
NLWs in IW.   
According to FM 3-24, the central issue in COIN operations is maintaining 
legitimate political power of an established government.70  However, just as important is 
the battle for the support of the population.  The difference is that a government can use 
levels of force to influence its citizenry to obey its laws in order to maintain its 
legitimacy, but more force results in obedience, not necessarily support.  A 
counterinsurgent is responsible for “establishing legitimacy and gaining popular support 
for the HN (host national) government.”  How legitimacy and support may be harnessed 
may be found in the following principles and imperatives. 
Principles of COIN include: 
• Legitimacy is the main objective. 
• Unity of effort is essential. 
• Political factors are primary. 
• Counterinsurgents must understand the environment.   
                                                 
69 United States Army, Field Manual 3-24, 1-28. 
70 United States Army, Field Manual 3-24, 1-1. 
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• Intelligence drives operations.   
• Insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support.   
• Security under the rule of law is essential.   




• Manage information and expectations. 
• Use the appropriate level of force.   
• Learn and adapt. 
• Empower the lowest levels. 
• Support the host nation.   
 
After the principles and imperatives, FM 3-24 lists several paradoxes of 
counterinsurgency.  The significance is that while these paradoxes are critical to the 
discussion of NLWs in COIN operations, they can not be referenced as a checklist, and 
serve as more of a guide of hazards to avoid during COIN operations.   
The following paradoxes represent just a few of the many lessons learned about 
the fluid and unpredictable nature of COIN:   
• Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be. 
• Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is. 
• The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and 
the more risk can be accepted. 
• Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. 
• Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot. 
• The host nation doing something tolerably is better than us doing it well. 
• If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works in this 
province, it might not work in the next. 
• Tactical success guarantees nothing. 
• Many important decisions are not made by Generals. 
 
 24
These lessons learned reflect years of time, energy, and resources invested, and 
sometimes wasted, in counterinsurgencies all over the globe over the past century.  After 
reviewing these principles, imperatives, and paradoxes one can see that the population’s 
support is contingent upon how well a weakened government can respond to its needs.  
This means that the government, and those supporting it, must not act in such a way that 
alienates the vast number of people who just want to feel safe.  Understanding the 
principles of COIN is central to the argument for using NLWs in IW.  Imperatives such 
as “use the appropriate level of force” and “learn and adapt” underscore the importance 
of considering unconventional weapons for unconventional warfare.  The paradoxes of 
COIN reinforce this argument.  The next section covers lethal force in IW and further 
examines how the U.S. military may achieve its goals without the catastrophic 
consequences associated with traditional military operations.   
C. LETHAL FORCE IN IRREGULAR WARFARE 
For more than half a century noncombatants have fallen victim to violence at an 
increasing and alarming rate.  In the 1950s, nearly half of all casualties were said to be 
noncombatants.  By the 1980s the number of noncombatants rose to roughly 80% of all 
casualties.71  The alarming trend of noncombatants injured or killed in combat operations 
should be enough to force those at the highest levels of government to carefully consider 
their strategy for future conflict.  In order to limit noncombatant death and collateral 
damage, and curb the subsequent violence that follows, there must be more than rhetoric 
when planning operations aimed at intervening rogue states or failed states.   
In his 2003 State of the Union address President Bush stated, “If war is forced 
upon us, we will fight in a just cause and by just means -- sparing, in every way we can, 
the innocent.”72  By December 2004, the administration appeared flummoxed with how 
to address issues associated with increased levels of urban attacks on U.S. armed forces.  
In an interview with Soldiers in Kuwait, then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld offered, 
                                                 
71 Joseph Siniscalchi, “Non-Lethal Technologies Implications for Military Strategy,” Center for 
Strategy and Technology, Air War College, Air University (Occasional Paper No. 3, 1998), 24. 
72 The Christian Science Monitor, “Who Counts the Casualties?” Global Issues.  
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0331/p15s01-wogi.html (accessed 3 August 2007). 
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“you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a 
later time.”73  The idea of using NLWs as a method of protecting innocents and 
demonstrating the ability to use the appropriate level of force may have significantly 
reduced the number of attacks made against U.S. troops by angry Iraqis.  This 
administration observed the need to change tactics in order to consider the fallout from 
attacking noncombatants, but continued only with rhetoric rather than actively seeking 
ways to implement a non-lethal policy for operations such as crowd control and 
checkpoint operations.   
In 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated, “The old rigid divisions 
between war and peace, diplomacy, between conflict and stability operations - those 
don’t exist any more.”74  The Secretary’s remarks ring true and conventionally organized 
military forces will face significant challenges to mission success if they are not 
restructured, trained and equipped for insurgent uprisings or civil disturbances in urban 
settings.  Although some future conflicts may emerge as conventional, it is essential that 
Soldiers and Marines have available to them an appropriate arsenal of weapons to 
accomplish their missions.  Sending them into such situations armed only with 
conventional weapons is highly inappropriate.   
In an IW environment, a full range of synchronized operations must include 
military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic organizations.  In 
COIN operations, counterinsurgents must support local institutions which serve to supply 
necessary social services, economic opportunities, public order, and security.  This 
relationship is mutually gratifying as each legitimizes the other.  But deeply rooted in all 
of this coordination, synchronization, and collaboration are cultural, ideological and 
societal tensions, as well as perceived injustices.   
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Unconventional conflict can not be approached in the same way as conventional 
conflict.  There are more than a few issues regarding the application of lethal force in 
counterinsurgency.  For example:   
• How does one balance using lethal weapons as a primary means yet still claim 
a respect for human life and pursue a public support agenda for one’s cause? 
• How might a counterinsurgent’s willingness to employ NLWs in certain 
situations, strengthen his position and add to his legitimacy, further weakening 
the insurgent? 
• How might the outcome of a situation be degenerated by the application of 
lethal force, in lieu of another method? 
 
The introduction of FM 3-24, states, “The military forces that successfully defeat 
insurgencies are usually those able to overcome their institutional inclination to wage 
conventional war against insurgents.”75  Where in one form of warfare there are nuances 
and subtleties, in the other there is only blunt force trauma.  Chapter 1 of FM 3-24 begins, 
“Counterinsurgency is not just thinking man’s warfare—it is the graduate level of war.”76  
If this holds true, and the primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster 
development of effective governance by a legitimate government, one must prudently 
consider the means by which he pursues his end.  If our Soldiers and Marines are to 
deploy to conduct irregular warfare, peacekeeping and/ or security and stability 
operations, they must be armed with weapons appropriate for their mission.  
Unconventional problems call for unconventional solutions.   
D. NON-LETHAL WEAPONS AND IRREGULAR WARFARE 
The connection between NLWs and irregular conflict is not easily drawn for 
students of conventional warfare.  With IW one must learn an entirely different 
perspective where goals, strategies, tactics and information operations are completely 
dissimilar to conventional warfare.  Galula espoused this doctrine in 1964 when he wrote 
of counterinsurgency,   
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Reflexes and decisions that would be considered appropriate for the 
soldier in conventional warfare and for the civil servant in normal times 
are not necessarily the right ones in counterinsurgency operations. A 
soldier fired on in conventional war who does not fire back with every 
available weapon would be guilty of a dereliction of his duty; the reverse 
would be true in counterinsurgency warfare, where the rule is to apply the 
minimum of fire.77   
Over forty years later, MG Peter Chiarelli mirrored those sentiments when he stated,  
The other thing I learned is we are good at lethal effects; but in a 
counterinsurgency, nonlethal effects are as important as, and, at times, 
more important than kinetic effects.  We are very good at fighting and 
breaking things and teaching other people to do the same.  But nonlethal 
effects are critical to winning the war in Iraq.  So, if we’re really serious 
about fighting an insurgency, we have to change our culture and accept the 
importance, and sometimes preeminence, of non-lethal effects.78   
In Iraq and Afghanistan, Soldiers and Marines are conducting operations where 
they are exposed to the use of humans as shields and so called “intermingled targets,” 
whereby assailants hide amongst the people or in vehicles parked next to mosques, 
hospitals and schools.  NLWs could be used to target those assailants without causing 
unnecessary loss of life or property damage.  NLWs are most effective for the stability 
operations conducted within COIN, but can also be applied in offensive and defensive 
operations, as well.  An example might include military police conducting activites where 
they will be expected to control or disperse a crowd, provide convoy protection, transport 
suspects or detainees, or just to augment their arsenal of lethal weapons.   
NLWs provide an option for those desiring to maintain control of a particular 
situation, person or population while also maintaining legitimacy and preserving basic 
human dignity.  NLWs are an option, to be utilized in appropriate situations, by trained 
professionals, and nothing more.  They provide the user with a tool to protect his interests 
and achieve his objective without the secondary effects associated with lethal weapons.   
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It is to this extent that NLWs may prove to be a valuable asset for a government to 
consider as it attempts to win the hearts and minds of an unsettled domestic population.   
In IW environments, combatants continually look for ways to exploit government 
weakness and cause the civilian population to lose faith in its ability to provide security.  
With NLWs employed into a COIN scenario, it is conceivable that the NLW might be 
used against the counterinsurgent and local population, particularly if used in concert 
with a lethal device.  How much more effective would insurgents be if they also had the 
capacity to apply rapid-hardening rigid foam traction modifiers or nets against first 
responders in the vicinity of a catastrophe?  If the government can blind, dazzle and 
disorient, one can expect that terrorists might try the same.   
The ability for the government to employ NLWs in IW is a major cause for 
concern, particularly with regard to who within the government can or should employ 
what sort of NLW.  This is a valid concern and a topic as highly contentious as any other 
associated with NLWs.  For example, on October 26, 2002, approximately fifty Chechen 
separatist guerrillas seized a theater in Moscow, taking approximately 750 hostages.  The 
hostage-takers were heavily armed, carrying automatic weapons, grenades and high 
explosives.  Refusing to negotiate with the separatists, the Russian government brought 
NLWs, as well as a small arsenal of lethal weapons.  On October 28th, Russian Special 
Forces released a gas form of the opiate anesthetic fentanyl into the ventilation system, 
resulting in comatose hostages and hostage-takers.  Unconscious hostages were rushed to 
hospitals and every unconscious Chechen was killed on site.  In the end, approximately 
33 terrorists and 128 hostages died.  Many survivors are expected to have permanent 
disabilities due to respiratory depression and aspiration pneumonia, resulting from an 
overdose of the opiate.79   
How, then, may a government use NLWs in lieu of the “shout or shoot” approach 
commonly associated with conventional military operations?   And, how might the 
government prepare for misapplications of NLW technologies by terrorists against its 
populace?  This is the minefield that the government officials who are charged with 
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protecting its citizenry, must navigate.  To back away from applying NLWs into IW 
operations risks sending the message that either the military or the government is too lazy 
to determine how to employ them, too dumb to determine which NLWs would be most 
advantageous for a given situation, or too scared to attempt a form of warfare that 
involves having to deal with dissatisfied people as human beings and not simply as 
targets.  
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Contemporary battles are non-linear and asymmetrical, requiring cooperation with 
combined and joint forces, enmeshing a multitude of technologies with social and 
cultural differences.  Today’s service members are expected to understand complex 
political, cultural and religious climates and appear professional and diplomatic at all 
times, particularly in this web-centric age of live streaming media and twenty-four hour 
news.  Ground troops have to make quick, tactical decisions in dangerous situations, 
sometimes during joint operations, while conducting non-standard missions, while also 
considering local civil populations and the media.  This underscores the importance of the 
issue and makes it incumbent upon military and civilian defense planners to consider all 
available options when preparing for conflict.  Although currently the President and the 
National Security Council (NSC) have not issued a formal policy on NLWs, such a 
policy might serve to accelerate current efforts.  Certainly, such a move would raise the 
issue of NLW proliferation from a DoD issue to an issue of national importance.   
Should the Commander in Chief choose to raise the issue of NLW proliferation to 
a more visible, international audience by establishing formal policy and officially 
endorsing the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) of their use, he would also be 
deliberately wading into the crux of the debate.  And while the president could bring 
considerable credibility to issues such as arms control, and the State Department could 
address issues pertaining to the military application of NLWs on civilian populations, 
finding anyone in the upper levels of government administration to address issues related 
to contracts, special interests and soft money may be elusive.  The decision to  
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decentralize control of the NLW program and let the DoD oversee its activities, by way 
of the JNLWP, make much more sense when viewed from the perspective of the highest-
ranking administration officials.   
There must be an educated discussion by our government officials to advance out 
understanding of how NLWs may be integrated into our global strategy as well as how 
our enemies may use those technologies against us.  There is a role for NLWs in IW.  The 
difficulty lies in educating and training leaders on the wide variety of non-lethal tools of 
force, as well as having an understanding of the terrorist threat.  NLW technologies cover 
the spectrum of possibility, including kinetic weapons.  As people begin to understand 
the vast array of NLWs being developed around the world, as well as the complexity of 
IW, it becomes very apparent that this is an issue with profound relevance.  There is a 
place for lethality during conventional warfare.  There is also a place for lethality in 
unconventional conflict.  But as technology advances, leaders must begin to look for 
ways to achieve their political goals while also protecting the sanctity of human life 
through the use of non-lethal methods.   
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III. CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Wider integration of NLWs into the U.S. Army and Marine Corps could 
have reduced damage, saved lives, and helped to limit the widespread 
looting and sabotage that occurred after the cessation of major conflict in 
Iraq.  Incorporating nonlethal capabilities into the equipment, training, 
and doctrine of the armed services could substantially improve U.S. 
effectiveness in conflict, postconflict, and homeland defense. 80 
 
As noted in FM 3-24, one of the keys to winning a counterinsurgency is winning 
the hearts and minds of the affected population.81  In most military operations being 
conducted around the world, it can be very difficult to differentiate between combatants 
and innocent civilians.  As such, any weapon employed which reduces collateral damage 
to property, or reduces the potential for killing noncombatants is beneficial.  This is 
especially significant for COIN operations as it is not necessarily desirous to kill the 
insurgent in order to declare victory.  NLWs may provide some answers for these 
tactically complicated problems.  For example, in Vietnam, if a patrol suddenly found 
itself taking sniper fire from a “friendly” village, the only options available involved 
either (a) return fire and risk generating even more casualties, or (b) break contact and 
withdraw.  Neither option is conducive to winning hearts and minds.  Non-lethal weapons 
offer the ability to capture a suspect for subsequent interrogation.  This capacity also  
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allows for intelligence gathering, “a critical element in defeating an insurgency.”82  As 
LtCol (USMC) Robert Norton, of the Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) Non-lethal 
Weapons and Capabilities (NLW/C) states, “NLWs allow a Marine to shoot first AND 
ask questions later.”83   
This chapter considers examples of actions taken by Soldiers and Marines in Iraq 
in 2003.  The examples include, crowd control, urban operations and checkpoint 
operations.  The conditions for each situation are similar: U.S. troops, stationed in Iraq, in 
2003, responding to an unconventional threat with conventional weapons and tactics.  In 
each instance, U.S. troops responded with what they believed to be the appropriate use of 
force.  The key to understanding why such actions were taken is as important as the 
actions taken themselves.  The purpose for this chapter is to further illustrate how 
leadership failures have contributed to the worsening of an already troubling state of 
affairs in Iraq.   
One section is allotted for each of the three separate issues.  After each issue, a 
brief discussion will address any changes to TTP taken by U.S. or other forces since the 
original incident.  Finally, a recommendation is included which offers non-lethal tools 
which may further prevent any such instances from happening again.84  In each issue, all 
troops acted in accordance with established ROE and only responded as they were 
instructed.  During each of the scenarios, no Marine or Soldier was ever charged with a 
crime, but their actions speak volumes about the U.S. government’s ability, or inability, 
to utilize options other than lethal force to achieve its stated goals.   
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B. CHECKPOINT OPERATIONS 
Issue.  In March 2003, U.S. troops fired upon a vehicle carrying thirteen women 
and children, killing seven, at a military checkpoint.85  According to reports, when the 
vehicle failed to stop at the checkpoint, troops were ordered to open fire, as they were 
apparently faced with no alternative means to make the vehicle stop. U.S. Central 
Command in Iraq later issued a public statement that its soldiers had followed prescribed 
rules of engagement to protect themselves.   
Discussion.  Soldiers and Marines must be able to differentiate between a 
legitimate threat and a noncombatant who may be disoriented or fleeing for his or her 
life.  The actions taken by those charged with operating the checkpoint may have 
profound results.  Stories continue to be reported of Iraqi families who failed to slow 
down at military checkpoints, resulting in injuries, deaths and strained relations between 
nations.  Meanwhile, U.S. and Iraqi forces continue to face a threat which uses vehicles 
loaded with explosives for suicide missions. 
Lt. Gen. Pete Chiarelli, the second highest ranking general in Iraq recently stated, 
“If you believe, like I believe, that the insurgency over time has repopulated itself, you 
have to ask the question why has that occurred?  I think this is one of the reasons.  What 
I’m trying to tell you (is) every time we do this we’re creating more people that shoot at 
us, make bombs and plant bombs.”86  COL Brian Jones, commander of the 3rd Heavy 
Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division agreed, “We need kits that block a road 
well up front of our lead and trail vehicles. Sawhorses, cones, signs, spike mats and 
similar tools help prevent these unfortunate circumstances from arising.”87  In response to 
requests from the warfighter, gun-mounted lasers are being fielded and tested as a means 
to get Iraqi drivers’ attention, so they will slow down, turn away or stop.  The Iraqi  
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Interior Ministry is also working with the U.S. on a well overdue media campaign aimed 
at instructing Iraqis how to conduct themselves around convoys and at checkpoints, so as 
to avoid any unnecessary injuries or deaths.    
Recommendation.  The Portable Vehicle Arresting Barrier (PVAB) is lightweight, 
portable, easily emplaced and recoverable.  This system can be unpacked/set-up for use 
with a two man team in less than two hours and allows normal traffic flow.  Upon 
command, if an approaching vehicle fails to stop, the checkpoint guard activates the 
system to capture mode with a remote control pendant from a distance between 300- 
1000 feet.  The capture net raises to full height in less than two seconds, wraps around 
vehicle, and the capture lines are tightened by vehicle motion.  It is capable of stopping a 
7,500 pound truck traveling at 45 miles per hour within a distance of 200 feet. Vehicle 
occupants are inhibited from opening doors, impeding escape. Another option is the 
Modular Crowd-Control Munition (MCCM) which resembles the claymore mine, except 
that it is filled with six hundred 32-caliber rubber pellets.  Other NLW options include:  
(1) Caltrops scattered on roads and runways.  Caltrops are non-reflective and always land 
with one of its four spikes in an upright position.  The spikes are hollow and can perforate 
a self-sealing rubber tire. (2) Road spikes can be thrown in front of speeding cars to blow 
out their wheels (3) Road barriers and devices may rise multiple feet above the road 
surface and physically prevent access to any vehicle.  (4) Vehicle Lightweight Arresting 
Device (VLAD) is a small, lightweight mesh blanket consisting of road spikes which 
entangles wheels and axles.  
C. URBAN RIOTS 
Issue.  In June, 2003, six British Soldiers and four Iraqi civilians were killed and 
another eight Brits and seventeen Iraqis wounded when a protest involving over four 
hundred people converged in the town of Majar al-Kabir.88  Apparently, the protest was 
in reaction to alleged “intrusive searches” by the British, that the local population felt 
offensive to Muslim tradition.  As the situation deteriorated and grew larger, more vocal 
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and more violent, the British were left with only rubber bullets and lethal ammunition to 
quell the uprising.  As children began to throw stones, the British responded with warning 
shots followed by lethal fires into the crowd.     
Discussion.  In this previous scenario, the British found themselves in a situation 
familiar to Americans serving in Vietnam three decades earlier.  Troops were faced with 
either doing nothing at all or employing their lethal weapons.  This black and white 
perspective of conflict forces ground troops to make decisions which may have 
international repercussions.  Recognizing this, in 2006 the British Royal Marines reached 
out to the international community and, along with U.S. Marines, established a non-lethal 
training program during the annual Tradewinds exercise in Jamaica.89  More than 120 
troops participated in a scenario involving belligerents hurling bricks and flour bombs as 
well as demeaning insults at the students.  To begin, the “rioters” stayed primarily on the 
street and moved without obstruction.  But as the scenario intensified, they moved into 
the city alleys for a more authentic feel.  British Royal Marine Capt. Rhys Hopkins 
stated, “We teach the troops that they just can’t shoot unruly people…it is good to learn 
non-lethal systems to establish order.”90  In the end, over 1,200 troops were trained on 
how to appropriately handle an urban riot situation.  Although it took a tragic 
international incident to serve as the impetus for such training, the British have 
recognized the urgency to correct past mistakes and properly prepare their troops for the 
challenges associated with unconventional operations.   
Recommendation.  A variety of NLWs exist which may be significantly 
advantageous for dismounted troops encountering an unfriendly mob, but preferring to 
maintain control of the situation rather than exacerbate it.  One of the most effective 
systems, and the only one recommendation here not yet available to the military, is the 
Active Denial System (ADS).  The U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and the 
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JNLWD have teamed up to develop a non-lethal technology which may be as useful as 
Israel’s “Scream” weapon.  The ADS uses electromagnetic energy to stop or deter a 
hostile enemy.  It provides the user the ability to stop aggressors without causing 
permanent injury and before a confrontation turns deadly.  With a range of 700 yards, the 
ADS can be used for protection of DoD resources in operations such as peacekeeping, 
humanitarian missions and other unconventional situations in which lethal force is 
undesirable.  Another interesting option would be a variation of the Long Range Acoustic 
Device (LRAD).  This NLW consists of a 45-pound dish, which can emit a warning tone 
at a level that is adjustable and capable of permanently damaging hearing, and 50 times 
the normal human threshold of pain.  The maximum range of the LRAD is 500 yards, but 
at 300 yards its tone is similar to the high-pitched shrill tone of a smoke detector, only 
louder.  These devices have been used on U.S. ships since the summer of 2003.91  Other 
options include MK4 Pepper Spray, M84 Stun Grenade, M1012 12-Gauge Rubber 
Projectile, M1013 Crowd Dispersal Round, M203 40mm M1029 Crowd Dispersal 
Cartridge, M1006 40mm Sponge Round, GG04 Stun Hand Grenade, and the M26 Taser.  
D. CROWD CONTROL 
Issue.  In his book, Fiasco, Tom Ricks details an unfortunate crowd control 
situation occurring in Iraq between civilian demonstrators and U.S. military personnel on 
patrol near Fallujah.92  The situation may very well have been avoided, if only for the 
employment of non-lethal technologies.  An active duty Colonel is quoted saying, “The 
lead vehicle fires a warning shot to get (the people) out of the way… a gunner in one of 
the rear vehicles puts his head down and opens up with a fifty cal, just opens up, and lays 
down seven people.”  Another witness states,  
The demonstration was approximately 200 persons… (S)ome shots were 
fired from AK-47 assault rifles from the rear of the demonstration.  
Generally these shots were not aimed, sometimes they were.  The Humvee 
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gunner from their D Co. (Anti-Tank Company), did fire a burst of .50 cal.  
The Iraqi who was killed I remember the most was an elderly man who 
took a .50 cal round to the head at short range.  Given that I was not in that 
soldier’s position, I cannot say he made a bad call. 
Discussion.  Both descriptions of this situation reflect a common theme, which is 
that U.S. forces responded to civilian demonstrators with the level of force they deemed 
appropriate and people subsequently died.  Unfortunately, this situation may have been 
avoided had these troops been trained on and equipped with NLWs such as those used by 
U.S. troops in Somalia in 1995 and Kosovo in 2000.  Various countries around the world 
actively train on and employ NLWs for situations just as this.  For example, the Israeli 
Army used a non-lethal weapon to disperse a crowd of Palestinians, numbered in the 
hundreds, who were demonstrating against Israel’s security forces in the West Bank in 
2005.93  When the Palestinians began throwing rocks at the Soldiers, the Israelis 
employed a weapon they call the “Scream,” which emits bursts of sound that causes an 
overwhelming sense of dizziness and nausea.94  The target feels “dizziness, and nausea 
and potentially a burning sensation on the skin, and ultimately they could not stay for any 
length of period in the effective range of the weapon.”95  This NLW fires what amounts 
to acoustic bullets at a desired frequency which can be dialed up or down depending on 
the amount of energy one desires to generate.  It can not be overstated how useful a NLW 
such as a land based LRAD, the Israeli “Scream” or ADS would be for U.S. troops in 
future IW scenarios.   
Recommendation.  Barring fielding of a land based LRAD, ADS, or “Scream,” 
for U.S. troops currently deployed, M84 stun hand grenades may prove useful.  These 
may confuse and disorient the enemy by causing pain, shortness of breath and extreme 
discomfort, but no long term effects.  Several variations of the MK19 grenade launcher 
can achieve effects similar to stun grenade, but from a distance of 100-500 meters.  Other 
                                                 
93 National Public Radio online, “Malcolm Davis discusses the non-lethal weapon used by the Israeli 
Army to disperse a Palestinian crowd using sound waves.” All Things Considered.  
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=853298511&Fmt=3&clientId=417&RQT=309&VName=PQD&cfc=
1 (accessed 5 September 2007). 
94 CBS News Online, “Israeli Army Gets The Scream,” World.  
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/06/10/world/main700979.shtml (accessed 5 July 2007). 
95 Ibid. 
 38
options include MK4 Pepper Spray, M1012 12-Gauge Rubber Projectile, M1013 Crowd 
Dispersal Round, M1029 Crowd Dispersal Cartridge, and the M26 Taser.    
E. CONCLUSIONS 
History generously provides us with hindsight and that hindsight is the luxury that 
allows people the ability to look at how things might have been different given another 
chance.  For example, NLWs may have proved useful during Operation Restore Hope in 
Somalia between 1992 and 1993.  Foamed barriers, noxious smells, and piercing audio 
waves might have been utilized in lieu of lethal ground-based and airborne platforms.  In 
Rwanda, electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) or other high-energy technologies could have 
quashed radio broadcasts urging genocide.  In Macedonia, malodorants or dyed foam 
coupled with personnel-capturing nets could have used against those who attacked the 
U.S. embassy in 1999.   
General Wesley Clark’s extensive bombing campaign in 1999 against Serbian 
targets in Kosovo serves as another example.  He engineered successful air strikes against 
Serbian targets in Kosovo, largely to minimize the risk of death to American ground 
forces and noncombatants and to reduce unnecessary collateral damage.96  NLWs might 
have made a difference if NATO jammed Serbian TV broadcasts or radio towers, similar 
to how the U.S. employed these technologies over Iraqi power stations during Operation 
Desert Storm.  EMP could have been used to disable air-defense and other military 
electronic systems.  Noxious malodorants, delivering revolting smells, could have been 
used against command and control facilities.  NATO could have blocked, rather than 
bombed, key bridges railroads, and roadways.  
After the bombing campaign had ended, changes were considered, and when 
military police deployed to Kosovo, in 2000, they deployed prepared to use NLWs.  For 
this mission, they were tasked with conducting peace support operations, civil military 
operations, and provide support to local Kosovar law enforcement for various missions.97  
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While working peace enforcement operations, the soldiers quashed civil uprisings on two 
separate occasions with NLWs.98  But examples of success such as that of the MPs in 
Kosovo in 2000 or of General Zinni’s experience in Somalia in 1995 are far outnumbered 
by examples of failure.   
Currently, the TTP of second guessing actions taken by commanders through 
studies of after action reviews (AAR), lessons learned websites, and articles in the media 
is a reactive approach to how we engage our adversaries.  The current priorities of senior 
leaders do not address the use of NLWs and how they can be incorporated into the 
arsenal of available weapons alternatives.  Therefore, the consequence of not having 
NLW alternatives may result in more tactical blunders and missed opportunities.  In each 
scenario described within this chapter, tools were available which could have saved lives 
and done more to help win advantage than those actions which were taken.  There must 
be an expectation for leaders to demonstrate vision and maximize opportunities to 
employ tactics, which do more than make a bad situation worse and bring about only 
effects associated with death and destruction.   
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IV. NLWS AND STABILITY OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When used, force should be precise, timely, appropriate and 
proportionate. However, any recourse to force should be designed to 
resolve and defuse a crisis, and prevent further escalation. The 
unnecessary or irrational use of force may provoke a hostile reaction 
throughout the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and adversely affect the 
perceived impartiality and credibility of the Pharmaciens Sans Frontieres 
(PSF), leading potentially to a loss of consent and the possible failure of 
the mission.99 
This chapter looks at how U.S. troops conduct stabilization operations and 
considers if NLWs might be used to facilitate those operations.100  With over 325,000 
troops deployed worldwide, conducting a variety of missions including peacekeeping, 
combat, security and deterrence operations, the need for non-lethal alternatives appears to 
be only increasing.101  From 1992 to 2001, for example, the U.S. military engaged in 
almost 60 military operations.102  Many of the missions included providing humanitarian 
aid, noncombatant evacuation operations and stabilization and reconstruction.  As noted 
previously, these challenges are likely to increase in the foreseeable future.  After 
examining U.S. military involvement with stabilization operations, this chapter will then 
consider costs and benefits associated with NLWs to determine whether their use would 
be problematic or advantageous.    
                                                 
99 Organization for African Unity, “Peace Support Operations: A Working Draft Manual for African 
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In stability operations, Soldiers and Marines can expect to control crowds, deny 
access to personnel and vehicles, neutralize vehicles, clear facilities, and shape the area of 
responsibility (AOR) as needed.  It is unacceptable to expect Soldiers and Marines 
conducting stability and support operations to be equipped only with weapons which kill 
people or destroy buildings, commerce and social order.  In order to achieve success 
noncombatant casualties must be kept to a minimum.  Limiting collateral damage and 
noncombatant deaths serves to encourage stability and restore key infrastructure.  NLWs 
facilitate conflict diminishment; however, this is contingent upon the availability of the 
appropriate weapons and properly training those charged with their use.   
In general, most military missions that the U.S. concerns itself with are aimed at 
restoring peace and stability.  Subsequently, the ultimate goal of these missions can not 
be accomplished through destruction and brute force.  NLWs are designed to provide the 
user the capacity to incapacitate or repel a hostile, much as lethal weapons, but without 
the permanent consequences.  There are currently a wide variety of counter-personnel 
and counter-materiel NLWs, as well as some counter-capability options which can be 
used in conventional military operations and in unconventional warfare, such as COIN 
operations.  In the end, a successful COIN operation rests on the counterinsurgent’s 
ability to protect the population, and meet their needs to the extent of overt support from 
the populace for the government.  And while there still exists the possibility of 
misapplication or misuse of these weapons, the comparative diminution of irreversible 
damage makes them all the more advantageous for stability operations.   
B. RISKS  
In this section I examine the strategic, tactical and personal risks involved with 
NLWs.  Strategic risks include the misconceptions and misinterpretations of various 
international laws and treaties governing their use; operational risks include the (ROE) 
which establish tactical guidelines for the employment of NLWs; and tactical risks 
involve ensuring Soldiers and Marines are adequately familiarized with the NLW 
contained within their arsenal and addressing the possibility of NLWs being used against 
U.S. service members.   
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1. Strategic Risks 
The strategic risks of using NLWs may be great to a user facing an uninformed 
public with misunderstandings about the legality or morality of their use.  For example, 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW) have identified electro-shock 
technology used as a method of torture used in at least 76 countries, including the United 
States and other developed and lesser developed countries.103  The problem with 
targeting NLWs solely as a product used for torture is that “torture is an issue of human 
intent, not devices.”104  This is exactly the point Rappert argues when he states, “any 
object can be used as an instrument of torture or ill treatment, it is the intent of the user 
that is the problem.”105  Alexander agrees that regardless which weapon is used, what 
matters is the intent of the user.  He states, “The North Koreans are reported to employ a 
simple but effective method for obtaining information… they use a hammer to smash a 
joint on the prisoner’s finger.  The argument has nothing to do with non-lethal weapons, 
but rather, the intent of the perpetrator.”106  
Because of a general lack of understanding of the methodology of torture, 
watchdog groups such as the HRW and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) have strongly opposed the proliferation of NLWs, going so far as campaigning to 
have them banned.107  What these organizations and others like them fail to recognize is 
that torture, regardless of the tool used, is immoral and illegal and strictly prohibited by 
the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Geneva Conventions (to include Protocol I 
passed in 1977).108  Critics may argue that people who are incapacitated or immobilized 
by entanglements or adhesives will be subsequently easier to target with lethal weapons.  
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This contradicts Article 41 of the Geneva Additional Protocol 1 1977, which stipulates 
that a person who is “hors de combat shall not be made the object of attack.”109  All 
members of the DoD must comply with the law of war and it clearly prohibits such 
actions.110   
The question of legality is a slippery slope, particularly when it involves litigation 
against the U.S. For example, the United States employed NLWs during Operation 
Desert Storm when Tomahawk Cruise missiles dispersed thousands of carbon fibers over 
an electrical power station.  The carbon fibers drifted down and short-circuited the power 
station.111  Following Operation Desert Storm, the human rights organization Middle 
East Watch claimed that since the U.S. had so called “smart munitions,” the use of “dumb 
bombs” was illegal.112  Nothing substantial materialized, but the legal groundwork had 
been laid and in a country as litigious as the United States, it is not unrealistic to imagine 
another country might pursue such a judicial recompense.   
2. Operational Risks 
The purpose of ROE is to establish limits to how Soldiers and Marines may 
respond in conflict.  With this in mind, it becomes paramount that ROE are concise and 
easy to read it in order to effectively limit how forces may dispense violence and restrict 
Soldiers and Marines from acting recklessly.  ROE for lethal and non-lethal weapons 
should be the same and should be written by the commander, in concert with his staff, 
reviewed by his legal advisor, for the benefit of the troops.  ROE should accommodate 
strategic level political issues while at the same time being precise enough so that the 
troops at the tactical level can understand what they can and can not do.  Pretentiously 
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written legalese will only serve to confuse and frustrate Soldiers and Marines who may 
not have the luxury of legal counsel standing by to advise them.   
Another operational risk associated with NLWs involves determining the 
appropriate situation for their use.  Commanders must not just establish well-written 
ROE, but also consider which situations warrant NLWs and whether their forces are 
adequately prepared to employ NLWs competently.   NLWs shape circumstances in such 
a way that an uninformed or misled commander may order his troops to employ NLWs 
when lethality is warranted.  One can easily imagine a situation where an adversary 
manipulates the media.  If the U.S. responds to a violent situation with lethality, an 
adversary may claim that those killed were simply demonstrators.  There will be an 
expectation for U.S. forces to use NLWs in conflict.   
3. Tactical Risks 
Soldiers and Marines must have confidence in their weapon system in order to 
support their commander’s guidance and confidence can only be attained as a result of 
training.  If a Soldier or Marine is not confident in their non-lethal system, they will be 
apprehensive to employ them and their NLW will become little more than extra baggage.  
Only through familiarization, extensive qualification and testing, and simulations and 
exercises will ground forces feel confident employing NLWs.  Alexander addressed the 
importance of training when he wrote, “Part of the opposition to non-lethal weapons by 
troops on the ground is that they are unsure of how well the weapons systems will 
perform.”113  The long term risks of not properly training Soldiers and Marines with 
NLWs may be measured in claims of excessive use of force and the erosion of public 
support.   
Another tactical risk associated with NLWs involves the enemy’s ability to 
employ these weapons against U.S. troops.  Insurgents do not abide by the Hague 
Regulations or Geneva Conventions and any insurgent, criminal or terrorist would readily 
accept any device which might be used to further their efforts.  How much more effective 
would a terrorist plot be, if given the capacity to apply traction modifiers, nets or rapid-
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hardening rigid foam against first responders in the vicinity of a catastrophe?  If 
envelopes laced with Anthrax powder can shut down a federal building, the same could 
be said for terrorists releasing a gas derivative of the opiate anesthetic fentanyl into the 
ventilation system of a federal building or on an airplane while in flight.  One can 
imagine the effect of not simply killing masses of people, but doing so in such a way that 
truly terrorizes even those not directly affected by the act.  If the government can blind, 
dazzle and disorient, one can expect that others might do the same.   
C. BENEFITS 
The need for NLWs is self-evident when one considers the scope of operations 
the military must carry out.  As General Wayne Downing pointed out in 1994, “It’s kind 
of incongruous to be someplace on a peacekeeping mission and kill people.”114  The DoD 
established a mandate in 1996 in the form of Directive 3000.3, Policy for Non-Lethal 
Weapons, which states, “Non-lethal weapons, doctrine, and concepts of operation shall be 
designed to reinforce deterrence and expand the range of options available to 
commanders.”115  NLWs support DoD strategy and provide an alternative for tactical 
troops faced with shouting verbal warnings and firing lethal munitions.  This section will 
specifically address how NLWs may benefit the strategic, operational and tactical goals 
of the DoD.   
1. Strategic Benefits 
The obvious benefits for employing NLWs in combat operations include a 
reduction in collateral damage and consideration for facilities and infrastructure.  The 
costs absorbed by a country which destroyed another and must therefore incur the 
responsibility for reconstruction can be staggering.  According to The New York Times,  
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In the days before the war almost five years ago, the Pentagon estimated 
that it would cost about $50 billion.  But the deteriorating situation in Iraq 
has caused the initial predictions to be off the mark by a scale that is 
difficult to fathom. The operation itself... is costing more than $300 
million a day.  That translates into a couple of billion dollars a week and, 
over the full course of the war, an eventual total of $700 billion in direct 
spending.116 
This is in contrast to the Marshall Plan, widely considered to be a model for 
economic re-building after World War II, which cost more than $13 billion, or roughly 85 
billion dollars today.117   
The message sent by using NLWs, when employed legally and properly, is that 
the U.S. respects the sanctity of human life and will commit itself to the moral high 
ground.  The ability to convey this message will be contingent upon senior leaders 
communicating clearly with the media and through its information operations (IO).  This 
message is particularly relevant to stability operations where “winning hearts and minds” 
remains a strategic objective.  One way to support this strategy is to limit the adversary’s 
ability to attack without unnecessary killing or destruction.  For example, counter-
materiel technologies could be used to disable an enemy’s air defense or field artillery 
systems before they are employed.  This sends the message that the U.S. military is 
capable of achieving its objectives without catastrophic consequences and may seriously 
impact an enemy’s will to fight, particularly after learning he might have been killed had 
lethal weapons been used.   
2. Operational Benefits 
NLWs will facilitate a much easier transition from conflict to post-conflict 
operations than kinetic weapons.  Alexander states, “By cutting down on casualties 
whenever possible, these weapons can assist in the enemy’s acceptance of terms for 
                                                 
116 The New York Times, “What 1.2 Trillion Dollars Can Buy,” Business.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/17/business/17leonhardt.html?ex=1326690000&en=7f221bfce7a6408c&
ei=5090%23secondParagraph (accessed 7 September 2007). 
117 Estimates regarding combat and post-combat operations vary depending on sources and metrics 
used.  For a substantive review and discussion, see Stephen Lewarne and David Snelbecker, “Economic 
Governance in War Torn Economies: Lessons Learned from the Marshall Plan to the Reconstruction of 
Iraq,” Long Report, The Services Group, USAID. http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNADB572.pdf (accessed 
7 September 2007). 
 48
termination of conflict while minimizing resistance and animosity that destabilizes the 
post-conflict situation.”118  Families may be traumatized by a loss of liberty, income or 
loved one, and the U.S. can not afford to add fuel to the fire by responding to a crisis with 
an inappropriate response.  Consider the person who is guilty of nothing more than 
consuming too much alcohol when Soldiers enter his domicile armed only with lethal 
weapons.  NLWs allow for intangibles that lethal weapons do not.  One must consider the 
collection of actionable intelligence that may be derived from being able to isolate, 
capture, and interrogate a person rather than kill him.  NLWs provide our troops better 
situational awareness, improved targeting and precision of lethal systems, instantaneous 
results, scalability, reduced risk for catastrophic consequences, and applicability to the 
full spectrum of military operations, both unconventional and conventional.   
Any weapons, tools or technologies that can provide combatant commanders with 
more options, is useful.  This holds particularly true for stability operations where 
commanders must be prepared for conflict involving individuals, crowds, combatants and 
noncombatants.  NLWs allow forces to separate good guys from bad guys and collect 
actionable information for use in future operations.  NLWs help fill the gap between 
inaction and the use of deadly force and have the potential to enhance mission 
effectiveness and reduce casualties.   
3. Tactical Benefits 
As the U.S. military becomes less engaged with conventional operations and more 
involved in stability operations, a greater need will inevitably emerge for developing 
skills to deal with noncombatants, rather than armed soldiers.  Tactical operations will 
become less about death and destruction and more about establishing security and rule of 
law and restoring government power.  NLWs, most of which are readily available 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies, can be used to augment existing assets to 
stop, deter, or turn back an approaching adversary.  In a tactical environment, NLWs may 
be used for crowd control, to reduce damage to infrastructure and lessen the long term 
environmental impact of conventional weapons, and limit noncombatant fatalities.  Some 
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of these weapons are already being used in various locations by the U.S. military, but the 
majority being used come in the form of the NLCS, which equips a platoon of 
approximately 30 Soldiers.   
Current stabilization and reconstruction operations require new tools such as the 
NLCS and U.S. troops are currently applying this system in tactical situations overseas.  
The NLCS contains primarily low technology kinetic, chemical and optical systems, to 
include the Taser.  These sets also contain various “riot control” tools such as flexi-cuffs, 
batons, shields and bullhorns.  By early 2004, around 80 NLCS were known to be 
shipped to various locations around the world, but mostly to Soldiers and Marines in Iraq 
and Kosovo.119  U.S. forces in Iraq also have the LRAD and various bright lights and 
lasers for use protecting convoys and stopping vehicles at checkpoints.  Had more of 
these NLWs been made available to Soldiers and Marines during the initial phases of 
combat, and in the immediate aftermath following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, 
much of the sabotage and looting that occurred may have been avoided.   
D. COSTS 
According to a February 2004 article by an independent task force sponsored by 
the non-partisan Council on Foreign Relations, the use of NLWs could have significantly 
changed the course of Phase IV reconstruction in Iraq120  The task force summarized, that 
“equipping U.S.-trained and supported local forces in Afghanistan and Iraq with NLW 
would help reinforce authority and be more acceptable to the local population.”121  It also 
recommended expanding the office of the JNLWP and vastly increasing the JNLWD 
budget.  Currently, the JNLWD operates on a budget of $43 million annually, up from 
seven continuous years of approximately $22 million but still inadequate according to the 
report.122   
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Alexander argues, the cost of NLW research, development, testing, and fielding is 
negligible in comparison to the entire U.S. DoD budget.  He states, 
my best guess is that the total military NLW arms budget for the entire 
world is about fifty million dollars (U.S.).  Of that, $44 million is allocated 
by the United States. When compared with other arms development and 
operational expenditures, the cost of NLWs is nearly insignificant.123   
Alexander goes on to argue that through 2004, the cost of operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan ran five billion dollars per month; the U.S. Missile Defense Program costs 
nine billion dollars annually; one F-22 fighter aircraft costs about three hundred million 
dollars, which is six times that spent on NLWs in 2004; 10 M-1 tanks (less than a single 
company) is roughly equal to that spent on all NLWs the same year; and finally, one 
nuclear carrier ran four billion dollars to build and twenty two billion for the life cycle.  
This means that NLWs made up about 0.3 per cent of the 2004 U.S. R&D budget, which 
accrued $16 billion annually, and only comprised 0.012 percent of the total U.S. DoD 
budget, roughly $380 billion annually.124   
The costs of design, research and development, training, and fielding must be 
proportionate to effectiveness.  Lethality may edge out measured response for simplicity 
and/or cost effectiveness.  However, all of the NLWs described in this paper have already 
been tested and are ready for fielding.  Future funding will have to be based upon results 
of existing NLWs and potential for future operations based on military strategy.  There 
must be a dialogue between tactical users of NLWs and those designated to provide 
funding to ensure that money is wisely spent on those systems used most effectively and 
for which we are prepared to argue both the legal and moral reasons for their use.   
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E. CONCLUSIONS 
Due to failures at the strategic level, the benefits of using NLWs do not currently 
overwhelmingly outweigh the risks.  Just as Soldiers and Marines must train to gain 
proficiency, so too must senior level leadership.   This is precisely where leadership has 
failed.  Senior military and civilian leaders must recognize the appropriate situations for 
NLWs and ensure that the forces charged with using these weapons are properly 
resourced and adequately trained.  An example of being properly resourced, but 
inadequately trained involves the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) elite hostage 
rescue teams (HRT) to successfully employ NLWs at Waco, in 1994, cast NLWs into a 
dim light and resulted in the loss of 82 Americans, at the hands of Americans, on 
American soil.125  An example of not recognizing an appropriate situation includes 
checkpoint operations in Iraq.  In 2005, U.S. troops manning a checkpoint fired upon a 
vehicle carrying a recently freed Italian journalist and her escorts, killing one of the 
intelligence agents assigned to protect her and wounding another.126  Opportunities 
appeared between Waco and the war in Iraq and a few such opportunities were exploited 
such as Somalia in 1995 and Kosovo in 2000.  Unfortunately, neither Somalia nor 
Kosovo served to effectively change the common misperception that NLWs are anything 
less than novelty weapons.  Until our country can adequately identify optimal 
opportunities for NLWs and ensure users are properly resourced and trained, success 
stories will be too few and far in between to make a difference.   
NLWs can no longer be considered toothless tools consisting only of stun guns 
and bean bags.  Although NLWs are not going to completely replace the necessity for 
lethal weapons, they are cost efficient, benefit everyone occupying the AO, and have a 
place in contemporary military operations.  The 2004 Force Application Functional 
Concept (FAFC) states,  
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The shifting military environment is likely to see greater mixing of enemy 
combatants with noncombatants and there are likely to be situations where 
lethal force is undesirable.  Increasing non-lethality widens the range of 
effect the joint force is able to achieve without using deadly force.  Non-
lethal ability should not detract from our ability to apply lethal means as 
required.127   
The examples cited in this chapter serve to illustrate that the FAFC findings are 
based on research which supports the crux of this paper, which is that NLWs are relevant 
to today’s military operating environment and must be considered as such by today’s 
senior military strategists and war planners.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
These weapons are actively being sought by all branches of the U.S. 
military and come in a dazzling variety, from “incapacitants” or 
chemicals that put people to sleep, acoustic and light-pulsing devices that 
disrupt cognitive and neural processes; odors so disgusting they sicken; 
sudden colored fog that creates panic; optical equipment that causes 
temporary blindness; and mechanisms that stimulate nerve endings as 
though they are fire, among dozens of others.128 
 
Politically, religiously or ideologically driven insurgents are only going to be 
conquered when the message they are purveying no longer appeals to either the masses or 
to enough of their “soldiers” to keep their political movement going.  To undermine an 
insurgency’s message, the legitimate authorities have to establish the conditions in which 
the economy and employment are vibrant, as well as punishing the perpetrators of 
violence and minimizing collateral damage to innocents.   
This study examines the use of NLWs in IW and highlights the broader concepts 
associated with the increasing us of U.S. service personnel active in foreign civil affairs.  
Essentially, the U.S military must determine whether the use of violence by political 
actors in an urban environment is a form of warfare, or simply criminal activity.  This 
invariably leads to the question of how any security force can neutralize, cause the 
dissolution of or destroy a politically driven group of violent actors without disrupting the 
society in which they are enmeshed.  If the battle is an extended one, a large array of non-
lethal tools must be considered.   
As militaries become active in such political activities as planning economic 
development and running essential services their must also be discussions pertaining to 
how to approach the problem of MOUT or COIN.  What specific NLWs might be useful 
in one situation or another?  How can we keep our military adhering to its traditional 
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position in regard to civilian authority?  How do we help dysfunctional societies achieve 
the requisites for democracies while fighting insurgencies, crime, ignorance, superstition, 
radicalization and poverty?  U.S. forces are facing these challenges like these every day 
as they work to provide resources and services to the people of Iraq and Afghanistan.  
NLWs might be more appropriate in situations when it is difficult to distinguish an 
innocent bystander from a potential gunman, as well as for sweeping routes for IEDs and 
VBIEDs, and stopping vehicular suicide attacks before they reach their target.   
This study has illustrated the seemingly impossible mission and responsibilities 
associated with those missions for the US military.  For those situations, Soldiers and 
Marines are going to need a wide variety of weapons, both kinetic and non-kinetic.  In 
sum, there remains little doubt that NLWs are an effective resource for those seeking to 
curb the effects of catastrophic damage associated with lethal munitions.  This study 
concludes that NLWs can enhance US armed forces IW operations by providing a robust 
set of non-lethal alternatives without increasing cost or risk.  NLWs can enhance the 
capability of American forces in conflict and post-conflict environments and should be 
integrated into doctrine and current military operations.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Currently, the United States’ investment into NLWs is unparalleled.  DoD funds 
an impressive array of non-lethal technologies which may be used in irregular operating 
environments.129  But without increased and continued funds for research and 
development, and informed and proactive leadership, the efforts of past proponents will 
be for naught and U.S. troops will again be left with only lethal weapons for use in IW.  
This section will present recommendations for further incorporating NLWs into the 
arsenal of the U.S. military.   
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1. Strategic Recommendations 
For seven years the JNLWD was forced to conduct business with a budget of 
approximately $22 million annually until 2004 when the budget increased to just over 
$43 million.  The Secretary of Defense should consider the recommendations of the 2004 
CFR sponsored Task Force cited in the previous chapter, which also argues for a larger 
budget.  Although the JNLWD budget almost doubled in 2004, the CFR contends the 
JNLWD budget is still inadequate and should be increased seven-fold.130  The CFR 
recommends a budget closer to $300 million a year, which still amounts to less than $1 
for every $1,000 spent on defense.131   
The Task Force presents four actions for further integrating NLWs into the U.S. 
military: 
• Expand NLW deployment more widely in the Marine Corps and the Army 
Infantry.  Ensure that Navy and Air Force have such capabilities adapted for 
their force-protection missions.  
• Extend the range of NLW payloads to 100 meters though precision delivery 
and fusing systems.  
• Complete development of the NLW system that can stop, deter, and turn back 
an advancing adversary from hundreds of meters by heating the skin of an 
individual without permanent injury.  
• Advance the development of concepts such as the advanced tactical laser— 
which shows promise for use against equipment— along with the advent of 
nonlethal payloads that home in on a laser spot.132 
There must be comprehensive discussions between senior level civilians and 
senior military representatives regarding the application of non-lethal technologies for 
strategic objectives.  Senior leaders must determine how NLWs may be employed to  
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facilitate, and not restrict, Soldiers and Marines.  They must also consider strategic 
consequences, if any, which may arise and determine the most effective means of 
employing such weapons.   
Civilians should be encouraged to ask questions and demand answers from their 
legislators.  Too many lessons may be drawn upon regarding NLW successes, failures 
and missed opportunities in combat environments.  People should understand how their 
military is being prepared for warfare and what is being done to ensure their safety.  
Winning public support is an essential aspect of to integrating NLWs into the military 
arsenal because without it senior leaders will hesitate to present guidance and establish 
the policies and regulations which guide our service members.  Establishing policies and 
regulations is essential because those same policies and regulations will be used by 
combatant commanders to develop clear and concise ROE for ground troops.  This means 
that if our national strategy is to prepare for and conduct “full spectrum operations,” 
senior leaders, both civilian and military, will be forced to consider a legitimately full 
spectrum of options.   
2. Operational Recommendations 
Commanders are encouraged to review current policies relevant to NLWs and 
revise policies accordingly.  Disseminate all relevant changes to ensure clear guidance is 
understood by all subordinate commands.  NLWs should be incorporated into the 
acquisition process and NLW training should be incorporated into all training plans.  
Careful and continuous evaluation of the effectiveness of these tools will help maintain 
an accurate historical record of all NLW activities.  Those systems that have been proven 
most successful should be made programs of record in order to facilitate full systems 
integration.   
One set of ROE should cover both lethal and NLWs.  With this in mind, 
combatant commanders should understand where NLWs fall in the force continuum.  
NLWs provide the combatant commander with additional options for scenarios that do 
not clearly require lethality.  Therefore, it is essential that ROE is developed by the 
commander for the troops and not passed off to be written by the Judge Advocate 
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General (JAG).  Complex or ambiguous ROE will only confuse those Soldiers and 
Marines who may be forced to make life and death decisions.   
3. Tactical Recommendations 
Incorporating NLWs into U.S. military operations might have significantly 
minimized civilian casualties, decreased damage, and prevented the extensive looting that 
occurred following the conclusion of MCO in Iraq in 2003.  In a joint statement with 
Tony Blair issued in April 2003, President Bush stated,  
We also grieve for the loss of civilian life in Iraq. Coalition forces take 
great care to avoid civilian casualties.  We are taking every step possible 
to safeguard Muslim holy sites and other protected places in Iraq that are 
important to the religious and cultural heritage of Islam and of Iraq.  We 
reaffirm our commitment to protect Iraq's natural resources, as the 
patrimony of the people of Iraq, which should be used only for their 
benefit.133   
Resources such as NLWs might have significantly improved the effectiveness of 
Soldiers and Marines to support the President’s goals and may help forces in future 
conflict and post-conflict operations.   
Soldiers and Marines operate at the level of where the axe meets the grindstone.  
All tactical level users of non-lethal technologies must evaluate the effectiveness of their 
weapons, both lethal and non-lethal, for their operations.  One may present a compelling 
argument against employing some NLWs, but the arsenal is multi-dimensional and aside 
from cost, or physical limitations, it would be hard to argue against all NLWs.  If it is 
determined that opportunities exist whereby a certain NLW could improve current TTPs, 
then there comes a responsibility to make those findings known.  However, if it is 
determined that NLWs will only serve to impair current TTPs, then it is equally 
important to make those findings known.   
It is essential that the tactical level users of these technologies communicate their 
experiences both vertically and horizontally, and compile lessons learned for use by 
                                                 
133 White House, “Joint Statement by President Bush, Prime Minister Blair on Iraq's Future,” (press 
release 8 April 8 2003).  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030408-1.html (accessed 7 
July 2007).  
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resources such as Inter-Service NLW Instructor Course (INIWIC) and the Center for 
Army Lessons Learned (CALL).  INIWIC is the only school authorized by the DoD to 
train units and certify NLW trainers.  Not only is training provided for all services at Ft. 
Leonard Wood, Mo., but also in the form of mobile training teams (MTT), who may 
travel at a unit’s request to any military installation in the United States for home base 
training.  INIWIC is vital to any discussion about NLWs because it represents where the 
axe meets the grindstone.  Tactical feedback to CALL and INIWIC may serve as a direct 
link between the NLW user and those responsible for fielding NLW technologies.    
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APPENDIX A: FORCE CONTINUUM134 
 
                                                 
134 There are numerous versions of the force continuum.  The force continuum is applicable to any 
agent or agency, civilian or military, charged with applying force to establish and maintain security.  This 
depiction is based upon the author’s familiarity and experience with the weapons listed. 
Lethal 
Communication 
Barriers Sticky Foam 
Baton 
Pepper Spray Taser 
Stun Grenade 
Hand-to-Hand Combat 





40 mm NL munitions 
Non-Lethal 
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ACOUSTIC   
Audible sound Low level annoying sounds to disperse crowds. 
Infrasound 
Incapacitation, disorientation, nausea, vomiting, 
bowel spasms; effects stop when generator is 
turned off, no lingering physical damages. 
Infrasound from non-linear 
superposition of two 
ultrasound beams (tested in 
Great Britain) 
Intolerable sensations. 
Very Low Frequency noise Disorientation, vomiting fits, bowel spasms, uncontrollable defecation. 
BIOLOGICAL   
Neural inhibitors Incapacitates personnel, paralysing synaptic pathways. Induces reversible crippling effects 
CHEMICAL   
Adhesive agents 
Quick-setting polymer foams. Immobilize targets 
and require special solvents to remove. Mainly 
sticky foams. 
Barriers 
Dense, rapidly expanding aqueous bubbles. 
Isolates and immobilizes to control evacuation or 
escape. May be used with odours, dyes, etc. 
Calmative agents Temporarily incapacitate personnel. 
Hallucinogens Narcotics that disorient, confuse and incapacitate. 
                                                 
135 Vincent Sautenet, “Legal Issues Concerning Military Use of Non-lethal Weapons,” Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law, Volume 7, Number 2, (June 2000).  
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v7n2/sautenet72_text.html; accessed 30 August 2007.  The tables 
listed here have been modified slightly from their original form. 
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Irritants Pepper spray, gases, etc. Causes temporarily but intense and debilitating pain. 
Lubricants Turns dirt into chemical mud and makes surfaces slippery. 
Neuroblockers Tranquilizers darts and anesthetic bullets. Causes incapacitation. 
Neuro-inhibitors Loss of neurological control. The nervous system “overheats” and gets out of control. 
Taggants Tracks personnel 
ELECTROMAGNETIC   
Electronic riffles 
Includes taser, dart and stun guns. Debilitates 
central nervous system, short-circuiting human 
synoptic patways. Causes incapacitation.  
Pulsed High Power 
Microwaves (HPM) 
Induces confusion, stupor or coma. 
KINETIC   
Entanglement munitions Mainly nets. 
Non-penetrating projectiles Stinger grenades, wax, wood and plastic bullets. 
Water cannons May be used with chemical additives.  
OPTIC   
Low energy lasers May be used to temporarily blind personnel. 
Optical munitions Flash bang grenades, pulsing light, etc. 
Obscurants Inhibits observation. 




ACOUSTIC   
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Infrasound Disrupt metal and composite materials 
BIOLOGICAL   
Biodeteriorative microbes 
Degrades roads and bridges surfaces, turns 
aviation fuel into jelly, “eats” rubber of vehicle 
wheels. 
CHEMICAL   
Adhesive agents 
Quick-setting polymer foams. Immobilize 
targets and require special solvents to remove. 
  
Super-caustics Acids that corrode or degrade structural materials. 
Contaminators Additives that cause fuel to gel or solidify making it unusable. 
Liquid metals 
Embrittlement agents  
Agents that change the molecular structure of 
base metals or alloys, significantly reducing their 
strength. Could be used to attack critical metal 
structures, aircrafts, ships, trucks, metal treads. 
Lubricants 
Substances that cause lack of traction. Delivery 
by aircrafts. Can render roads, ramps, railroads 
unusable for limited time.  
Taggants Tracks equipment, materiel. 
ELECTROMAGNETIC   
Conductive particles Any variety of particles that can induce short circuits in electrical or electronic equipment. 
Directed energy/Particle 
beams 
Destroys electronic systems. Changes molecular 
structure of weapons rendering them useless. 
Non-nuclear electromagnetic 
pulse 
Pulse generators producing gigawatts of power 
could be used to explode ammunition dumps or 
paralyze electronic systems. Vulnerable systems 
include electronic ignition systems, radars, 
communications, data processing, navigation, 
and electronic triggers of explosive devices. 
Pulsed High Power Disrupt and neutralizes electronics. Shuts down 
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Microwaves (HPM) engines, explode ammunition. 
KINETIC   
Ceramic shards Damages aircraft engines and degrades air vehicle stealthiness. 
Entanglement munitions 
Nets, meshes, cables, chains, etc. Disables 
treads, propellers, rotor-blades, and axles 
trapping targets. 
OPTIC   
High energy lasers Destroy optical sensors 
Low energy lasers Includes laser rifles and anti-air laser canons. Overloads and disables electro-optical sensors. 
Optical munitions Anti-sensor munitions. 




APPENDIX C: APPLICABLE TREATIES AND LAWS136 
1.  Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its 
Annex:  Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land.  The 
Hague, 18 October, 1907. 
2.  Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.  Geneva, 17 June 1925. 
3.  Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field.  Geneva, 12 August 1949.   
4.  Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, 
Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea.  Geneva, 12 August 
1949. 
5.  Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 
12 August 1949. 
6.  Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War.  Geneva, 12 August 1949. 
7.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.  
Opened for Signature at London, Moscow, and Washington.  10 April 1972. 
8.   Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques.  10 December 1976. 
9.  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 
1977.   
10.  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 
June 1977.  (The U.S. is not a party to this protocol). 
11.  United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to 
Have Indiscriminate Effects (UNCCW).  Geneva, 10 October 1980. 
                                                 
136 This list is developed from various sources, however, an excellent resource for most of these 
treaties and laws is Erik Nutley’s paper, “Non-lethal Weapons: Setting Our Phasers to Stun? Potential 
Strategic Blessings and Curses of Non-Lethal Weapons on the Battlefield,” which is also cited in Chapter I, 
Section C of this paper. 
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12.  UNCCW Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I).  Geneva, 10 
October 1980. 
13. UNCCW Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-
traps, and Other Devices (Protocol II).  Geneva, 10 October 1980. 
14.  UNCCW Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary 
Weapons (Protocol III).  Geneva, 10 October 1980.  (The U.S. is a party to this 
protocol, with restrictions). 
15.  Nairobi International Telecommunications Convention, 10 January 1986.   
16.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.  Paris, 13 January 1993. 
17.  UNCCW Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV to the 1980 
Convention), 13 October 1995.   
18.  UNCCW Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-
traps and Other Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996 (Amended Mines Protocol).   
19.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 18 September 1997.  (The U.S. is 
not a party to this convention). 
20.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998.  (The U.S. is not 
a party to this treaty). 
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